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ABSTRACT 
In discussions about the ethics of enhancement, it is often claimed that the concept of ‘human 
nature’ has no helpful role to play. There are two ideas behind this thought. The first is that 
nature, human nature included, is a mixed bag. Some parts of our nature are good for us and 
some are bad for us. The ‘mixed bag’ idea leads naturally to the second idea, namely that the fact 
that something is part of our nature is, by itself, normatively inert. The Inert View claims that 
nothing normative follows from the mere fact that some trait is a part of our nature. If the Inert 
View is correct, then appeals to the value or importance of human nature in debates about 
enhancement are indeed misplaced. We argue that the Inert View is wrong, and that a certain 
concept of human nature – which we refer to as human form – does have an important role to 
play in debates about enhancement.   
 
1. Introduction 
 With the world warming at an alarming rate, Matthew Liao, Anders Sandberg, and 
Rebecca Roache have recently argued that we should think seriously about enhancing humans to 
deal better with a warmer planet.1 Similarly, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson have argued 
that to effect the change in lifestyle needed to avoid environmental catastrophe, our ‘moral 
motivation must be enhanced so that [we] pay more heed to the interests of future generations’.2 
 These are but two discussions in a larger debate about when, if ever, it is morally 
permissible to enhance human beings. A common move in these discussions is to claim that the 
concept of ‘human nature’ has no helpful role to play here. It's easy to see why. As John Harris 
puts it, ‘Famines, floods, droughts, storms are all natural and all disastrous’.3 Harris' point is that 
                                                
1Matthew S. Liao, Anders Sandberg and Rebecca Roache, ‘Human engineering and climate change’, Ethics, Policy 
& Environment 15.2 (2012), 206-221. 
2 Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, Unfit for the future: The need for moral enhancement (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 2. Persson and Savulescu are also concerned with enhancing our moral motivation so as to 
allow for changes in our mode of life that will allow us to effectively prevent terrorism.  
3 John Harris, ‘Enhancements are a Moral Obligation’, in Julian Savulescu and Nick Bostrom eds., Human 
Enhancement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 134. 
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nothing evaluative, let alone normative, follows from pointing out that something is natural. As 
Frances Kamm puts it, ‘The human and the good are distinct conceptual categories’.4  Some 
things that are part of (our) nature (such as arrogance) are surely bad for us. And some things 
that are not part of our nature (inhuman altruism perhaps) may well be good for us.5 So how 
could pointing out that some trait is part of human nature tell us anything about whether we 
would do well to change it (or not)? ‘What is natural,’ concludes Harris, ‘is morally inert’.6  
There are two ideas behind this line of reasoning. The first is that nature, human nature 
included, is a mixed bag. Some parts of our nature are good for us and some are bad for us. The 
‘mixed bag’ idea leads naturally to the second, namely that the fact that something is part of our 
nature is, by itself, normatively inert. The Inert View, as we shall call it, is not that there is no 
such thing as human nature. Nor is it that all traits that belong to human nature are normatively 
inert, since proponents of the inert view think that some parts of our nature are good for us while 
others are bad for us. The claim, rather, is this: 
 
Inert View: Nothing normative follows from the mere fact that some trait is a part of our 
nature. Its naturalness does not, on its own, tell for (or against) it. 
 
If the Inert View is correct, then appeals to the value or importance of human nature in 
debates about enhancement are indeed misplaced. We will argue, however, that the Inert View is 
wrong, and that the concept of human nature does have an important role to play in debates about 
enhancement. The Inert View seems unavoidable if the ‘mixed bag’ view of human nature is 
correct. And the mixed bag view seems unavoidable given a certain sense of human nature, 
which we will refer to as the ‘statistical concept of human nature’. But we will show that the 
statistical concept of human nature is insufficient for thinking about our nature. Indeed, the 
statistical concept relies upon a different, non-statistical sense of human nature, which we will 
refer to as ‘human form’. And the notion of human form, we will argue, is conceptually tied to 
what is good (and bad) for humans. To say that something is part of human form entails that it is 
part of our good, part of what is good for us. So, to claim that a particular enhancement would 
                                                
4 Francis Kamm, ‘What Is and Is Not Wrong With Enhancement?’, in Julian Savulescu and Nick Bostrom eds., 
Human Enhancement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), n.13 103. 
5 These are Kamm's examples. 
6 Op. cit. note 3, 134. 
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eliminate or drastically alter some aspect of human form gives us pro tanto reason not to make 
the change. Likewise, to claim that a particular enhancement would contribute to or genuinely 
enhance some aspect of human form gives us pro tanto reason to make the change. Contra 
Kamm, the human and the good are not simply ‘distinct conceptual categories’. 
It is important to be clear about what we are claiming. Our claim is that the Inert View as 
stated above is false because it fails to hold for a certain important sense of ‘human nature’ – i.e., 
human form. However, we are not claiming that the Inert View fails to hold for the statistical 
concept of human nature. Nor are we claiming that the statistical concept of human nature is 
itself misguided, or that it should be abandoned. Rather our claim is that human form is a distinct 
and legitmate sense of human nature, and that (in ways described below) any attempt to spell out 
a statistical conception of human nature depends upon the notion of human form. Moreover, the 
notion of human form sheds important light on questions of human enhancement. 
By distinguishing between two senses of human nature, we can clarify both what is true 
and what is misguided in the position of those who reject entirely a role for human nature in 
debates about enhancement. If the only viable concept of human nature were the statistical one, 
then indeed the ‘mixed bag’ view would likely follow, and with it the Inert View. In that case, 
Tim Lewens might be right to claim that ‘we are in fact better off if we refrain from mentioning 
human nature altogether in debates over enhancement’.7 What that claim misses, however, is the 
importance of the human form concept of human nature. 
Crucially, we not claiming that once one recognizes a role for human form in thinking 
about enhancement, one must conclude that all enhancement is impermissible or wrong or 
immoral. On the contrary, we think that appeals to human form in enhancement debates could 
just as easily lead to the conclusion that we should perform some particular enhancement than 
that we should not.  This is because whether an appeal to human does or does not offer support 
for enhancement in particular cases depends on the content of human form – i.e., a substantive 
account of what is actually true of human nature, in the sense of human form. Without such an 
account, the mere concept of human form is not going to settle questions about whether we 
should enhance in particular ways. 
                                                
7 Tim Lewens, ‘Human Nature: The very idea’, Philosophy & Technology 25.4 (2012), 460. 
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Now, we are not offering a substantive account of the content of human form.8 But then 
you might wonder: if introducing the concept of human form offers no practical guidance on its 
own about enhancement, what's the point of arguing against the Inert View and its correlative 
conclusion that we should just dispense with the concept of human nature in enhancement 
debates? To answer this question, and to bring our thesis more sharply into view, think about a 
concept that is obviously not normatively inert: well-being. Few would claim that nothing 
normative follows from the fact that something promotes or hinders human well-being. Indeed, 
as Alan Buchanan has suggested, the central question we must ask about possible enhancements 
is: Will this have a salutary effect on our well-being?9 If the answer is ‘yes’ then we plausibly 
have pro tanto reason to enhance. If the answer is ‘no’ then we plausibly have pro tanto reason 
not to enhance. 
But notice that thinking that the concept of ‘well-being’ is important for discussions 
about enhancement does not, on its own, tell us whether to enhance on any particular occasion. 
To know that, we would need a substantive account of well-being. The concept of well-being, 
then, does almost no work on its own. It is a frame, as it were, through which we look at the 
issue of enhancement. But it yields no answers without a particular picture of well-being inside 
the frame.  
Our claim is that the concept of human form functions in much the same way. The idea 
that the concept of human form does not, on its own, provide any practical guidance about 
particular enhancement debates is no more a knock against it than the idea that the concept of 
well-being does not, on its own, do so either. Just as the concept of well-being is hardly 
normatively inert, so too is the concept of human form. Indeed, as we shall argue, it is very 
plausible to think that the concept of human well-being is conceptually linked to the concept of 
human form. So the latter is no more out of place in debates about enhancements than the 
former.  
                                                
8Our defence of the place of the concept of nature in debates about enhancement, then, is different from those like 
Leon Kass, ‘Ageless bodies, happy souls’, The New Atlantis 1 (2003), 9 – 28; Francis Fukayama, Our posthuman 
future: Consequences of the biotechnology revolution (New York: Picador, 2002); and Michael J. Sandel, The case 
against perfection (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) who deploy particular (and contentious) 
conceptions of the content of human nature and its origin in order to caution against particular kinds of enhancement 
(Michael Hauskeller, ‘Human enhancement and the giftedness of life’, Philosophical Papers 40 (2011), 55 – 79  
offers a detailed defense of Sandel’s view.). For reasons that will emerge below, we do not see our position as 
lending support to the anti-enhancement camps. If anything, our view provides (modest) support for the 
enhancement camp. 
9 Allen E. Buchanan, Beyond Humanity? The Ethics of Enhancement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we explain the content and motivation for 
the Inert View. This leads to our critique in section 3, where we argue that the concept of human 
nature assumed in the Inert View is incomplete. In showing how it is incomplete, we introduce 
the notion of human form, which we explicate in some detail in section 4. In section 5, we first 
bring out the conceptual connection between human form and goodness in human beings. We 
then respond fully to the Inert View by showing that there is also a conceptual connection 
between human form and what is good for us. In section 6, we deepen this discussion by 
examining the place of vulnerabilities in human form. We conclude, in section 7, by drawing 
four conclusions for debates about enhancement that come from recognizing the importance of 
human form. 
2. The Inert View 
 The Inert View claims that whether or not a characteristic belongs to human nature 
provides, as such, no normative guidance concerning the proper response to that characteristic.  
One of the most articulate proponents of the Inert View is Allen Buchanan.10 According 
to Buchanan, when opponents of enhancement appeal to human nature to support their position, 
they are failing to appreciate that human nature is a mixed bag. Once we accept the mixed bag 
view, it follows that the fact that some trait belongs to human nature cannot, on its own, give us 
reasons for or against biotech interventions that would alter it. As Buchanan says: 
 
In principle, then, there seems to be nothing wrong with the idea of changing those parts 
of our nature that are bad, if this can be done without imperiling the good parts. To 
assume otherwise is to beg the question at hand, to assume, rather than argue, that 
changing human nature is itself a wrong. Further, we can give reasons – just the sort of 
reasons that we use to support judgments about the good in other cases – for why it 
would be good, other things being equal, to alter some of the more unsavory traits which, 
on some views, are part of human nature. For example, suppose, as some evolutionary 
biologists claim, that it is part of human nature – a widespread trait due to our 
evolutionary past – that we have a bias toward negative evaluations of those we regard as 
alien, as ‘not one of us’. Perhaps if this propensity were reduced, there would be fewer 
                                                
10In what follows we focus on Buchanan’s position, though we believe that his central points are supported by a 
large number of contemporary philosophers. We are using the terms ‘trait’ and ‘characteristic’ interchangeably. 
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wars and a reduction of the miseries that was bring. The reasons we have for changing 
this putative aspect of human nature are familiar reasons having to do with what is bad 
for us, with what tends to undercut our well-being.11 
  
Crucially, while the Inert View holds that human nature as such is normatively inert, it accepts 
that our given nature may well impose practical constraints on what is possible for us 
enhancement-wise: our bodies are such that substantially enhancing our eyesight, for example, is 
going to be easier than giving us the ability to fly. But the constraint that our nature provides on 
the possibility of enhancement is just that: a constraint. It is not, itself, normatively relevant.  
Moreover, it might be possible and desirable to remove the constraint itself through 
enhancement. In other words, the constraints that our nature places on us are themselves subject 
to evaluation from a standpoint that is independent of our nature. And thus nature’s constraints 
do not have normative significance in themselves. Buchanan provides a helpful analogy: 
 
[I]f we are limited to a particular canvas we only create a painting that fits within its 
boundaries and we should take that into account in deciding what to paint – on it. But if 
we have the option of using a different canvas, then there will be other possibilities (and 
other constraints, as well). Recognizing that a given canvas limits the artistic good we can 
achieve does not imply that we should refrain from changing canvasses; nor does it imply 
that we should change canvasses. But it does raise the question of whether there might be 
reasons for using a different canvas, if we can. We might come to realize that if we 
changed our nature in a certain way, we would become capable of goods that are not 
available to us but that would be worth pursuing.12 
 
Of course, to know whether or not human nature is a mix of good and bad, we need some 
understanding of what we mean by ‘human nature’. Buchanan offers the following account: 
 
Human nature is a set of characteristics (1) that (at least) most individuals who are 
uncontroversially regarded as mature human beings have; (2) that are recalcitrant to being 
                                                
11 Op cit. note 9, 137. 
12 Ibid., 123 – 124.  
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expunged or significantly altered by education, training, and indoctrination; and (3) that 
play a significant role in explanations of widespread behavior and in explanations of 
differences between humans and other animals.13 
 
 Because it relies on concepts like ‘most’ and ‘widespread,’ we will refer to this as the 
statistical concept of human nature.14 As Buchanan points out, this general concept of human 
nature is consistent with different substantive conceptions of human nature —  i.e. different 
accounts of which characteristics satisfy these three criteria. Thus one strategy for challenging 
the Inert View would be to begin with the statistical concept of human nature, and then to argue 
for a substantive account that is more optimistic than the mixed bag view. On the optimistic 
view, the characteristics that satisfy the three criteria (or something close to them), turn out to be 
only ones that are good (for us) rather than bad (for us), and thus we have reason to embrace or 
favor what is part of our nature. 
We have no interest in arguing for a more optimistic view of human nature, given the 
statistical concept of human nature. Moreover, we agree with Buchanan and others that if human 
nature is simply a mixed bag, then we should accept the Inert View. Nor are we opposed to the 
statistical concept of human nature per se. The question is whether the statistical concept is the 
only legitimate and important way of thinking about human nature. 
3. Beyond the Statistical View: Human Nature as Human Form  
The answer is that it is not. In fact, the statistical concept of human nature relies upon a 
different, non-statistical sense of human nature. We will refer to this second concept of human 
nature as human form, because it belongs to a larger category of life form concepts. Proponents 
of the Inert View have failed to consider the concept of human form, which captures a sense of 
human nature for which the claims of the Inert View are false.  
Let's look more closely at Buchanan's account of the statistical concept of human nature. 
Doing so reveals that in order to apply Buchanan’s own criteria for determining whether 
something is part of our nature – in the statistical sense – we must employ the non-statistical 
conception of human nature as human form. In this way, the concept of human form is 
                                                
13 Ibid., 118. 
14 A clear, concise version of this kind of account of human nature can be found in Edouard Machery, ‘A Plea for 
Human Nature’, in Arguing about human nature: contemporary debates, Stephen M. Downes and Edouard Machery 
eds. (New York: Routledge, 2013).  
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conceptually prior to the statistical conception of human nature.15 
Consider the first feature of Buchanan's statistical concept: a characteristic of human 
nature is one ‘that (at least) most individuals who are uncontroversially regarded as mature 
human beings have’. This suggests rightly that in reflecting on human nature, we should direct 
our attention to ‘mature’ human beings: animals grow and develop, and a theory of human nature 
should take our maturation into account. Moreover, in figuring out which characteristics belong 
to human nature, we want to know what is true about humans at their developed stage. A theory 
of dog nature that never got past the puppy stage would be inadequate (though very cute), and so 
would a theory of human nature that ended before adolescence. 
 But how are we to understand the notion of ‘mature,’ and how are we to say what counts 
as maturation in human beings? Unless we can identify certain things as mature or immature, the 
first criterion will be impossible to apply. We might be tempted to think that maturation can be 
defined simply in temporal terms, and that the ‘mature’ ones are those that have reached a certain 
age. But this can’t be right. For an organism (human or otherwise) might be around for a long 
time, but fail to mature – its growth might be stunted or inhibited, even though it continues to 
survive. The stunted, immature organism might even outlive all its un-stunted, mature relatives. 
So maturation is not a matter of mere temporal persistence.  
Perhaps, then, what really counts as ‘mature’ is what usually happens with individual 
organisms as time goes by, in the sense of what is statistically likely to happen. But this cannot 
be right either. Consider the birds of Chernobyl which have substantially smaller brains than 
their non-irradiated counterparts.16 The right thing to say here is not that what counts as mature 
for the birds in question has changed. Rather, the birds of Chernobyl have failed to mature fully, 
remaining instead in a stunted or inhibited state. And this would be true if, instead of being 
limited to Chernobyl, the background radiation in question blanketed the earth. Another example 
comes from the humble mayfly, among whom only a few individuals reach adulthood out of 
thousands born.17 Becoming a mature mayfly is statistically very uncommon, and in the right 
(well, the wrong) circumstances, the same could be true for human beings as well. How, then, 
                                                
15 The discussion in this section is heavily indebted to Michael Thompson, ‘Apprehending Human Form’, Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 54 (2004): 47 – 74. In section 4, we turn directly to Thompson’s view, and our 
debt is even more clear.  
16 Anders Pape Møller et al. ‘Chernobyl birds have smaller brains’, PLoS One 6.2 (2011): e16862. 
17 See Michael Thompson, Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press 2008), chapter four. 
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are we to understand the concept of ‘maturity’ invoked in Buchanan's conception of human 
nature?  
Before answering that question, let's turn to another criterion in Buchanan's conception 
which raises similar questions. According to the second feature of the statistical view, a 
characteristic of human nature is ‘recalcitrant to being expunged or significantly altered by 
education, training, and indoctrination’.18 We can apply this second criterion only if we are able 
to determine which events count as ‘education, training, and indoctrination’. This may seem like 
an easy task, but a little reflection reveals that it is not. 
The ideas of ‘education’ and ‘training’ imply, at minimum, the development of some 
capacity in response to outside influence. If an organism’s capacities are left unchanged, or the 
source of change is entirely within the organism, we would not describe this as an instance of 
‘education’ or ‘training’. Of course, in order for education or training to take place, there must be 
a capacity that is receptive to being developed. It is impossible to educate an earthworm in 
mathematics, or to train a snail to play catch, because those organisms lack the relevant 
capacities. Crucially, however, even when the relevant capacity is present, not just any change in 
a capacity introduced by an outside influence will count as education or training. We do not 
‘educate’ a young child’s capacity for speech by removing his tongue, though that will certainly 
influence that capacity. Likewise, education and training can fail to occur. Or, once begun, they 
can be interrupted. The education of a toddler’s linguistic capacity will be interrupted if she is 
lost in the forest and raised by wolves.  
Perhaps we should say, then, that a capacity is educated or trained when it is subject to 
influences, or altered in ways, that are statistically common. In some cases, this might pick out 
the extension of ‘education’ or ‘training’. But it will not do as a criterion for what it is to be 
educated or trained for reasons familiar from our discussion of maturity: it is perfectly possible 
for there to be a widespread failure of education and training. What happens to the unfortunate 
child lost in the woods might, in principle, happen to the majority of children! 
Whatever it is to be mature is not just a matter of what most members of a given species 
or group are like when they're old. Whatever it is to be educated is not just a matter of what 
influences the capacities of most members of a species or group. What, then, is required to get a 
grip on these concepts?  
                                                
18 Op. cit. note 9, 118.
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Let’s start with ‘maturation’. Consider again that a particular organism might fail to 
mature, or that even every member of a species might fail to mature. These possibilities show 
that the concept of maturation implies the idea of an unfolding process that is subject to potential 
interruption. In conceiving of something as maturing in the way that living things do we draw on 
some conception of what is supposed to happen with the kind of thing we are considering. The 
idea of such an unfolding process gives a special sense to the question, ‘What happens next?’ 
Crucially, when we ask this question about an organism in the context of wondering what it is to 
be a mature instance of its kind we are not asking for a prediction about what will happen to this 
particular organism. The answer to the prediction question may depart wildly from the answer to 
the question ‘What happens next in the process of maturation for this kind of thing?’ Think again 
of the mayfly. The answer to, ‘What happens next?’ where this is a question about what is going 
to happen to this particular mayfly, is likely to be, ‘It will die’. The answer to, ‘What happens 
next?’ where this is a question about how the mayfly, as a kind, matures from whatever stage of 
development we're currently looking at, is something else altogether. The second question is 
asking about the process of maturation in ‘the mayfly’, a process that is interrupted in the case of 
most particular mayflies.  
 And what is true of maturation in mayflies is equally true for maturation in hibiscuses, 
hamsters, and human beings. Our understanding of what constitutes an organism's maturation is 
not a statistical summary. Rather the relevant concept of ‘mature’ implies a non-statistical sense 
of how things stand with organisms of a particular kind – a particular conception of ‘what they 
do’ or ‘how things go with them’ when they mature. And the truth of such a conception is 
consistent with widespread failure and interruption of the process(es) of maturation in 
individuals. 
Thus in order to apply the first criterion of the statistical concept of human nature, we 
must have some other, non-statistical conception of human nature. For the statistical concept 
relies upon the notion of maturation, and we have no way to determine what counts as a mature 
human apart from some non-statistical conception of human maturation.  
        A similar point holds for concepts like ‘education’ and ‘training’. They too imply a 
conception of an unfolding process that is subject to potential interruption. In conceiving of an 
organism's capacity as being educated, or failing to be educated, we draw on some conception of 
what is supposed to happen with the capacities of the kind of thing we are considering. This is a 
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conception of ‘how things go with them’ when they are educated or trained, an understanding of 
what counts as educating or training a given capacity. Such a conception is not a statistical 
summary of the population. Rather, it is conceptually prior to any statistical summary, for such a 
conception is necessary to so much as identify an instance of education or training, and to 
distinguish a case of education and training from a lack of, or interruption in, education and 
training. The statistical concept, then, depends upon some non-statistical conception of what 
human beings are like, of ‘how things go with us’, with respect to educating and training our 
capacities.19 
4. Human form and the representation of life 
At this point, the reader may be asking what a non-statistical conception of an organism’s 
nature, or form, amounts to. The most fully developed account of this comes from Michael 
Thompson. In Life and Action,20 Thompson examines what is involved in our representation of 
living things as living. He concludes that in order to represent any individual as living, we must 
employ some (implicit) understanding of the life form to which that individual belongs, i.e. a 
conception of the organism's kind. This conclusion is supported by the following two claims:21 
 
1. In order to represent any individual thing as living, we must represent some 
goings-on as vital processes of the organism. 
2. In order to represent any goings-on as a vital process, we must bring it under the 
‘wider-context’ of a conception of the life form to which the organism belongs.  
 
The key thought in the first claim is that to be alive just is to be doing certain things that count as 
vital processes – e.g. eating, breathing, hunting, reproducing. If we couldn't identify any 
happenings as vital processes of one sort or another, we would have no grounds for supposing 
that we were dealing with a living thing. Thus representing something as living requires 
representing some happenings as vital processes. 
 The second claim is that in order to represent some process as a vital process, we need to 
place it in the context of the thing's life form. Why? The basic idea is that if we attempt to 
                                                
19 What of Buchanan's third component of his conception of human nature? We consider it below, p. 12. 
20 Op. cit. note 17. 
21 There is also a third, crucial claim which connects the representation of life to the evaluation of it. We discuss this 
in detail in section 5. 
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consider a process in isolation from the kind of organism in which it occurs, there is nothing to 
fix the proper description of what is happening qua vital process.  
To see this, consider the fact that vastly different physical-chemical happenings can 
amount to the same vital process across different life forms – e.g. ‘hunting’ or ‘breathing’ or 
‘reproducing’ can be instantiated in different physical-chemical happenings in aardvarks, ants, 
and albacore tuna. Moreover, the same physical-chemical happening can amount to different 
vital-processes in different life forms. A striking illustration of this is the process of mitosis, 
which is process of self-maintenance in human beings and reproduction in amoebas. Apart from 
a conception of the life form in which a process is taking place, there is nothing to fix the vital-
description one way or another, nothing to determine that this physical-chemical happening 
counts as ‘hunting’, ‘reproducing’, etc. Since representing something as living requires 
representing some goings-on as vital processes of the organism (claim 1), and representing some 
goings-on as vital processes requires a conception of the organism’s life form (claim 2), it 
follows that in order to so much see something as living, and to grasp what is going on here and 
now with an organism, we must interpret an individual through some conception of its life form.  
What, then, is involved in having a conception of a life form? A life form is represented 
in what Thompson calls a natural history, which is a system of natural historical judgments. 
Such judgments describe the characteristic features and activities of the life form, e.g. ‘the tiger 
has four legs’, ‘wolves hunt in packs’. Natural historical judgments have some canonical forms: 
‘The S is/has/does F’ or ‘S’s are/have/do F’. These judgments describe the function of different 
parts and activities in the life of the species. We make natural historical judgments when we talk 
about how the bald eagle builds its nests, or the African lion finds a mate, referring not to 
particular eagles or lions (who might, sadly, never build nests or find mates), but to the 
respective life forms that individual eagles or lions instantiate. The system of natural-historical 
judgments provides an ordered account of the organs and operations of the organism, and thus 
for any kind of organism it answers the question ‘how do they live?’ As Thompson says, a 
natural history provides ‘one’s interpretation or understanding of the life form shared by the 
members of that class’.22 
 Importantly, natural historical judgments possess a sort of generality that is neither 
universal nor statistical. From the fact that ‘tigers have four legs’ it does not follow that a 
                                                
22 Op. cit. note 17, 73. 
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particular tiger has four legs, or even that any tiger now living does. A disease may have ravaged 
the tiger population, leaving the current population three-legged. That sad state of affairs would 
not make the natural-historical judgment ‘Tigers have four legs’ false, though it would mean that 
each of the diseased tigers is missing a leg. 
 It should now be clear that natural historical judgments provide precisely what is lacking 
in the statistical concept of human nature. As we have seen, the statistical concept relies on ideas 
of ‘maturity’ and ‘education’. These ideas imply the idea of an unfolding process subject to 
potential interruption, and the relevant sort of process cannot be understood as a statistical 
summary of individuals of the species. But a natural history is a non-statistical conception of 
‘how things go’ with organisms of a particular kind. And a natural history provides an answer to 
the relevant question ‘What happens next?’, where the answer is not a prediction about what will 
happen to some individuals but an articulation of the stages of the process itself. Indeed, every 
vital process is an unfolding process subject to potential interruption. What fixes the arc of the 
process, and therefore determines what counts as completion versus interruption, is the kind of 
thing in which the process is occurring – i.e. the life form. Thus a life form conception makes it 
possible to do the very thing that a merely statistical approach cannot do, namely fix an 
understanding of what counts as ‘maturity’ or ‘education’. And it is only with this understanding 
that it is possible to judge whether particular individuals are mature or immature, educated or 
not. 
The same is true for Buchanan's third criterion for determining whether a characteristic is 
part of human nature, namely that it plays, ‘a significant role in explanations of widespread 
behavior and in explanations of differences between humans and other animals’. To apply 
Buchanan's third criterion we need to have some way of knowing what behavior we are dealing 
with on a given occasion. Unless we can identify instances of the same behavior, both within and 
across individuals, the task of explaining widespread behavior is impossible. And we have no 
way to say when various goings-on count as instances of the same behavior unless we can 
characterize those goings-on as some kind of vital activity – as instances of eating or walking or 
reproducing, etc.  
Now, identifying kinds of behavior is typically an easy task. We know when a human is 
swimming, and when she is singing; when she is swinging a bat, and when she is reading a book. 
Moreover, we are very good at knowing when two people are doing the same thing and when 
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they are not. The point is not that we have difficulty in identifying behavior. Rather the point is 
about what is required to be able to do this. And what is required is knowledge of the wider 
context of a life form conception. What counts as ‘singing’, ‘swimming’, etc. is not fixed by any 
features of the individual, or any physical-chemical description of the event, considered in 
isolation from a life form conception. To bring any activity or process under a vital description, 
and hence to describe it as one type of behavior rather than another, we need some non-statistical 
conception of the kind of thing we are dealing with, some conception of the species, or life form, 
in which these activities (or processes) occur. Thus to so much as begin the process of explaining 
widespread human behavior we must have a conception of human form.23 
Moreover, traits that might be widespread and uniquely human may not belong to human 
form. Imagine, for example, that 90% of adult humans have a certain heart defect, that this heart 
defect cannot be altered by education, and that it leads the humans who suffer from it to take a 
nap every afternoon at 3pm. According to Buchanan’s criteria, this heart defect would be an 
aspect of ‘human nature’. It would not, however, belong to the life form of ‘the human’, 
                                                
23At this point, one might worry that there is a deep problem for this view. For, on the one hand, we cannot 
understand any particular behavior or activity as the kind of thing it is without situating it in the context of the 
thing’s life-form. But, on the other hand, we cannot come to apprehend a thing’s life form without first observing 
particularly behaviors and activities (as particular behaviors and activities). Clearly, apprehending life-forms is not 
an a priori, armchair exercise; it requires actual fieldwork! But then it looks like, contra what we have been arguing 
here, any particular life-form conception must come after at least some preliminary statistical conception of the 
thing under observation (‘Hey look! All four of them have tail-like appendages!’). The solution to this problem is to 
differentiate between two claims: a) the conception of a particular life-form that we settle on comes after, and is 
based-on, particular observations of individuals of the life-form, and b) particular observations of individual 
organisms are prior to forming any conception of the thing’s life-form. The advocate of the life-form conception will 
grant a), but deny b). Of course our conception of the life-form ‘bobcat’ comes about from observing bobcats. It 
would be absurd to deny that. But this is consistent with thinking that even the initial observations of particular 
bobcats brought with them the idea of a form of life instantiated by this kind of thing, and that it is this idea – 
however implicit – that is required for the identification (or perhaps, initially, misidentification) of particular 
behaviors as instances of reproduction, or eating, or defectation etc. As Michael Thompson (Op. cit. note 15, 52) 
helpfully puts it in his discussion of jellyfish:  
 
At the outset, in your first vital descriptions of the first strange jelly you encountered, you did not make 
even latent reference to ‘umbrella jelly kind’ as such, which you hadn’t properly conceived. But you did, I 
think, make latent demonstrative reference to ‘this kind of jelly’ or ‘this form of jelly life’ – the kind or 
form of jelly before you. […] It is only in light of a conception of this form, however dim that conception 
might be, that you could intelligibly suppose, for example, that the tentacles are not parasites or cancerous 
excrescences or undetached bits of waste. 
 
This resolution to the problem should make clear something else about the view we are defending, namely that life-
forms are not unchanging essences or hidden ‘micro-structures’.  Life-forms themselves, and our conception of 
them, will change over time ‘as they are affected by selection, mutation, drift and so forth’ (Op. cit. note 7, 461).  
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precisely because it is a heart defect. To call it a ‘defect’ means that it is a interruption of the life-
cycle as spelled out in a system of natural historical judgments. A defect does not belong to the 
natural history; it does not play a part (in the relevant sense) in the life of the species, and it is not 
part of the life form. This is true even if the defect is widespread and helps to explain much of 
what goes on with the species.  
 The same point goes for some actual traits that Buchanan mentions as possible candidates 
for being part of our nature: 
 
It is said that to be human is to be selfish, to be inclined to excessive partiality, or to be 
sinful for example…[S]uppose, as some evolutionary biologists claim, that it is part of 
human nature – a widespread trait due to our evolutionary past – that we have a bias 
toward negative evaluations of those we regard as alien, as ‘not one of us’. Perhaps if this 
propensity were reduced, there would be fewer wars and a reduction of the miseries that 
wars bring. 24  
 
While these bad traits may be likely candidates for inclusion in human nature in the statistical 
sense, none of them are plausible candidates to be part of human form. For the very description 
of these traits makes them like the imaginary heart defect. In each case, the trait is construed as 
the misuse or malformation of the human mind or will, and hence each case implies a standard 
for the proper development and exercise of human capacities. To speak of ‘bias’ against 
outsiders implies that one is not weighing factors properly in one’s evaluations of others, that 
there is another way of evaluating them that would count as unbiased and correct. Likewise, 
‘excessive partiality’ implies that one has failed to get it right when it comes to concern for some 
versus concern for others (or everyone). Thus no matter how statistically common, recalcitrant, 
and explanatory these traits might be, they do not (absent some special story) merit inclusion in 
human form. 
 The point here is not that we should have a more optimistic view of human nature in the 
statistical sense. A view about what is part of human form is consistent with a very pessimistic 
appraisal of how most humans are doing. Rather the point is that any conception of a life form is 
a conception of the proper (=uninterrupted, undistorted) unfolding of its vital activities. Thus 
                                                
24 Op. cit. note 9, 136 – 137.  
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once we characterize something as a defect, or interruption of normal functioning in a human, 
then, no matter how common it is, it won’t belong to human form. 
5. The evaluative significance of human form: goodness as 
 Let's take stock of our argument so far. We've argued that the Inert View is grounded in 
the mixed-bag view of our nature, which itself relies on a statistical concept of human nature. 
We’ve also argued that the statistical concept of human nature depends upon a different, and 
conceptually prior, sense of human nature – human form. Moreover, we've shown how some 
traits – those that are defects – may be part of our statistical nature but not part of human form. 
Rather, they are interruptions and malformations of that form.  
 This last point relates directly to our rejection of the Inert View. It should now be obvious 
that the Inert View, as stated above, fails to distinguish between the statistical concept of human 
nature and human form. And we think there is nothing wrong with Inert View so long as the 
nature we're talking about is our statistical nature: 
 
Inert Viewstat:  Nothing normative follows from the fact that some trait is a part of our 
statistical nature. Its statistical naturalness does not, on its own, tell for (or against) it. 
 
Our statistical nature is a mixed-bag, and so learning that some trait is part of our statistical 
nature tells us nothing, on its own, about whether it is good or bad for us (let alone whether we 
should do something about it). 
 But if we're right, there is more than one way to understand the reference to ‘nature’ in 
Inert View. For by ‘human nature’ we might mean ‘human form’: 
 
Inert Viewform:  Nothing normative follows from the fact that some trait is a part of 
human form. Its status as part of human form does not, on its own, tell for (or against) it. 
 
Now, the Inert Viewform might be true as well. The point here is just that arguing that our 
statistical nature is a mixed-bag does nothing to show this, because that sense of ‘human nature’ 
is not relevant for assessing the Inert Viewform.  Thus, for all we've been told by the likes of 
Buchanan, Harris, Kamm, and others, we don't have reason to accept the Inert Viewform . 
 But this isn't a very satisfying place to stop. What we need is a positive argument to reject 
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the Inert Viewform. The start of such an argument can be found in our discussion above about the 
relationship between common human defects and human form. Recall that in explaining the 
representation of life forms, we noted that the existence of a three-legged tiger does not falsify 
the natural-historical judgment ‘the tiger has four legs’. Rather, given that ‘the tiger has four 
legs’, and that this tiger has three legs, it follows that this tiger is missing a leg. And this is just 
one instance of a larger point: a natural history makes possible evaluations of excellence and 
defect in individuals members of the kind. Indeed, a life form conception is a criterion for 
determining goodness in individuals of that kind.  
 Because the standard for such evaluations of goodness as in living things is an 
individual's life form, individuals of different life forms must be judged by different standards. A 
pigeon without wings is missing something, whereas a hedgehog without wings is not. Excellent 
vision in a mouse would be poor vision in a hawk. Thus if we want to evaluate an individual 
organism, we need to know what kind of organism we are dealing with. As we have seen, 
however, we can only represent something as living, and fix a description of any of its vital 
activities, by bringing it under some life form conception. So the very thing that is necessary to 
represent an individual as living – the representation of the life form – also provides the standard 
for evaluations of goodness in individuals qua members of this kind.25 Understanding and 
evaluation of living things are thus two sides of the same coin. As Thompson says, ‘we go no 
                                                
25 This formulation of the neo-Aristotelian position highlights why a recent criticism from Lewens misses the mark. 
Lewens claims that at best Thompson and Foot offer support for the view, established by a bevy of social science 
research, that people are ‘intuitive essentialists’ (Op. cit. note 7, 468). As he puts it, Foot and Thompson ‘have 
shown only that people are intuitive Aristotelians, without showing that Aristotelianism is a position we should 
adopt’ and that, ‘the onus is on the likes of Foot and Thompson not merely to show that much discourse seems 
committed to normative essences, but that there really are such essences’ (Op. cit. note 7, 469). The problem, as 
Lewens sees it, is that they cannot meet this burden because, ‘there’s no justification in biological reality for that 
conception [of a species’ nature]’ (Op. cit. note 7, 469). 
However, if what we’ve said is right, then Lewens is seriously mistaken. To begin, Thompson and Foot are 
not just helping themselves to ‘intuitive essentialism’ without argument. Rather, Thompson argues (convincingly we 
think) that any of our thinking about living things as living cannot dispense with life-form judgments. Indeed, as we 
hope to have shown, even the statistical conception of species that Lewens’ favors cannot do without the 
Aristotelian conception of life-form he wants to jettison. If Thompson’s arguments about life forms are correct, then 
we cannot so much as bring ‘biological reality’ into view without relying on life-form judgments; life-form thought 
is a precondition for there to be a subject matter of biological investigation. 
 The burden, then, is on Lewens to show where the arguments for life-form thought  – including those 
given here – go wrong. Oddly, Lewens never takes up this burden. In fact, he acknowledges this at one point, saying  
‘what follows is not intended as a refutation of their [Thompson and Foot] work, because I will not be addressing the 
most important parts of their case’ (Op. cit. note 7, 467). In another essay on Foot, Lewens also fails to address the 
core arguments we have outlined here. See Tim Lewens, ‘Foot Note’, Analysis 70 (2010), 468-473. 
Forthcoming in Philosophy 
Daniel Groll and Micah Lott 
18 
farther for critique than we went for interpretation’.26  
To understand human form, then, is to know what it is to be good qua human. But then it 
is wrong to say that human nature (understood as form) is one thing and human goodness 
another, and to leave it at that, or to assert, as Kamm does, that ‘the human and the good are 
distinct conceptual categories’.27 For there is a conceptual connection between an organism's 
nature (life form) and goodness in the organism, i.e. goodness as the kind of living thing the 
organism is. 
6. The normative significance of human form: goodness for 
 We have shown that the idea of a life form is implicitly evaluative in the following sense: 
to articulate a conception of a life form is, at the very same time, to provide a criterion for 
goodness and badness in bearers of that form. However, the Inert Viewform says that human form 
has no normative significance: the fact that some trait is part of human form does not, on its own, 
give us any reason to do anything. Our interest, after all, is in whether there's any place for the 
concept of human nature in debates about enhancement – debates about whether we have good 
reason to do something to ourselves. Pointing out that there is a conceptual connection between 
human form and goodness qua human doesn't obviously tell us anything about whether we 
should change human form. So for all we've said, it looks like Inert Viewform may well be true.  
Indeed, we can put the point more sharply. When we're wondering whether to enhance in 
a particular way, what we’re interested in is whether changing in that way would be good for us. 
                                                
26 Op. cit. note 17 , 81 (emphasis added). Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
uses the terms ‘natural goodness’ and ‘natural defect’ to describe the sort of goodness as or badness as that arises 
from a comparison between a) the representation of a life form, (e.g. ‘the tiger has four legs’) and b) the 
representation of an individual bearer of the form (e.g. ‘this tiger has three legs’). Foot also calls this ‘intrinsic’ or 
‘autonomous’ goodness in living things, since it is a kind of goodness that is not derived from our purposes for 
living things. When we speak about goodness as, or goodness in, it is this sort of intrinsic goodness that we have in 
mind.  
We can now understand better why traits characterized as defects or distortions cannot belong to the 
representation of the life form: the life form itself is the criterion for determining what counts as defect or distortion 
in individual members of the kind. We judge that a certain functioning of the human heart is defective by comparing 
individual hearts to ‘the human heart’, i.e. to a conception of the properly functioning heart, as defined by the natural 
history of human beings. It is thus not an ad hoc maneuver, or misplaced optimism, to say that defects are not part of 
human form. Rather it follows from the very judgment that something is defective, i.e. a lack of goodness as human 
beings. And this makes even clearer the difference between the statistical concept of human nature and the human 
form view. On the statistical concept, it makes perfect sense to say ‘to err is human’. On the human form view, it is 
closer to the truth (though less poetic) to say ‘what counts as 'erring' is determined by 'the human'’. We can, of 
course, affirm both of these senses of human nature without contradiction, so long as we keep straight which sense 
of human nature we have in mind. 
27 Of course, Kamm might have had in mind something like the statistical conception of ‘the human’ in mind when 
she wrote this. But if that's the case, then the point we made above (p. 14) applies here: the statistical conception of 
human nature supports the Inert Viewnature, not the Inert Viewform. 
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Good for has an essentially normative component. To say that X is good for Y entails that there 
is at least prima facie reason to do (or give X) for (to) Y.28 Goodness as, however, appears to be 
merely evaluative, without an essential connection to our reasons for acting. There would be no 
problem here if we could simply move from ‘good as’ judgments to ‘good for’ judgments. The 
worry, however, is that we cannot do this. For it seems that goodness as a living thing and 
goodness for a living thing can, and often do, come apart.  
Consider: does it follow from the fact that a particular mayfly is good qua mayfly that its 
life is good for it? Might not an excellent mayfly life be bad for the mayflies that have to endure 
it? There appears to be a conceptual gap between good qua and good for. And surely we have 
reason to pursue what is good for us, even if it departs from what makes us good qua human. 
Why, after all, should we continue caring about being good as human beings, if being good as 
human beings is not good for us? So even if there is a conceptual connection between life form 
judgments and goodness as, human form might still be normatively inert. If goodness as and 
goodness for are distinct, and if we have reason to pursue what is good for us, then human form 
is still inert from the perspective of what we have reason to pursue – including our reasons to 
change our nature when it is bad for us.  
 But appearances here are deceiving. In fact, what is good for a living thing does not float 
free from flourishing as a particular kind of organism. We can begin to see why by thinking 
about which things are good for living things, i.e. what benefits various organisms. Lots of 
sunshine is good for a cactus. Being in a mountain stream is good for a salmon. Drinking its 
mother's milk is good for a human infant. What do each of these things – sunshine, freshwater, 
and milk – have in common? In each case, the things enable the organism to carry out the vital 
activities characteristic of the kind of organism it is. They enable the cactus to undergo 
photosynthesis, or the salmon to breathe and swim, or the human to develop healthy brain cells 
and heart tissue, etc. In contrast, too much water is bad for a cactus, being on a forest floor is bad 
for a salmon, and drinking gasoline is bad for a human infant. Why? Because each of these 
things disrupts the characteristic parts and vital activities of the organism. In general, then, what 
benefits a living thing seems to be whatever helps it to live well as the kind of thing it is – i.e. to 
                                                
28 In some cases, the prima facie reason will also be a pro tanto reason. In other cases, it won't. We might think that 
it is good for the killer to get a new axe, without thinking that that gives anyone any reason to give the killer an axe. 
But this does not mean that there is no conceptual connection between X being good for Y and there being a reason 
to do X for Y. It just means that in some cases, the connection is undermined (while in others it is outweighed). See 
Garrett Cullity, The Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 17 – 18. . 
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do the things that make it good as a member of its kind, and enable it to live well as that kind of 
organism.  What is bad for an organism is what prevents it from living well qua the type of 
organism that it is. This idea is nicely expressed by Richard Kraut:  
 
[Living things flourish] by developing properly and fully, that is, by growing, maturing, 
making full use of the potentialities, capacities, and faculties that (under favorable 
conditions) they naturally have at an early stage of existence. Anything that impedes that 
development or the exercise of those mature faculties – disease, the sapping of vigor and 
strength, injuries, the loss of organs – is bad for them.29 
 
Since what counts as living well varies across life forms, what is beneficial or harmful also 
varies. Being at the bottom of a mountain stream is good for a salmon but bad for a human 
infant, just as being cradled in human arms is good for an infant but bad for a salmon. 
 If those things that benefit an organism are things that help it to live well as the kind of 
thing it is, and if harmful things impede such living well, it is a short step to the idea that what is 
good for an organism in the fullest sense just is living well qua the kind of thing that it is. For 
how could sunshine, water, or milk, be beneficial for those respective organisms, if what those 
beneficial things made possible – living well as a particular kind of thing – was not itself good 
for those organisms? 
 In response to this line of thought, a critic might grant the seemingly undeniable claim 
that  flourishing is indeed good for any organism, but deny that we can equate flourishing with 
the development and exercise of natural capacities. This objection grants that ‘flourishing is a 
good thing – good for what is flourishing’, but rejects the claim that our flourishing consists in 
our natural goodness, as faring well as the kind of thing we are. 
Someone might be led to this claim by considering examples where a creature seems to 
benefit from getting, or doing, something that is not part of the life-cycle of the life form. For 
example, it seems good for a tiger to be given nutritious food in a zoo, rather than having to 
undertake the difficult task of hunting in the wild. This is not the way for ‘the tiger’ to get its 
food, and so it doesn't make the tiger in the zoo naturally good with respect to its activity of 
                                                
29 Richard Kraut, What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2007), 131. 
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hunting (it precludes that goodness, in fact). But the zoo's food and method of delivery might be 
much better for the zoo tiger, in comparison to the difficult and dangerous business of hunting.  
 We think that this example and others like it do not, in fact, show that being naturally 
good is not necessary for being good for. There are two points to consider. First, the food the 
tiger is given must be what is naturally good for it – i.e. what is fit for tiger digestion – otherwise 
the food itself won't be any good for it. And what counts as ‘good food’ for a tiger? Precisely the 
sort of food that is necessary for its organs and operations to unfold properly, as defined by ‘the 
tiger’. So tiger-form still plays an essential role in fixing what counts as a ‘good thing’ for an 
individual tiger. Second, insofar as we attend to the tiger's way of getting food – the fact that it is 
not hunting – this is bad for our zoo tiger. The tiger is badly off, not well off, insofar as it is 
unable to carry out its naturally good hunting activity, and this is true even if the tiger can still 
enjoy food that is good for it without hunting – the loss of hunting is still a loss of naturally good 
activity, and a loss for the tiger. This point is supported by the common belief that keeping 
animals well fed but inactive is bad for them. And zoos that are better for their animals are ones 
that allow them to be active to a greater degree – and active precisely in those ways that are most 
naturally good for them (i.e. re-creating habitat, climate, objects of interest that engage the 
organism's capacities and allow those capacities to develop and be active). 
 But the objector might press another sort of example, more directly related to the 
enhancement debate. Suppose that a particular tiger was able to run 150 miles per hour, thereby 
becoming much more successful in hunting. Being able to run 150mph is not naturally good for a 
tiger. It does not belong to ‘the tiger’ to run that fast. But a tiger who cannot run that fast is not 
thereby defective! On the contrary, being able to run that fast would likely be good for a 
particular tiger. And so goodness as and flourishing seem to come apart.30  
 We are willing to grant that being able to run 150mph could be good for the tiger, even 
though being able to run that fast is certainly not a requirement for natural goodness in a tiger. 
We deny, however, that the goodness of being able to run that fast can be understood apart from 
tiger-form. On the contrary, being able to run that well would be good for an individual tiger 
only because, and insofar as, being able to run that fast would enable and sustain the tiger in 
realizing other aspects of its naturally good life. What the enhanced running capacity does is 
                                                
30A similar example involving a snail is discussed in David Copp and David Sobel, ‘Morality and Virtue: An 
Assessment of Some Recent Work in Virtue Ethics’, Ethics 114 (2004), 514 – 554.  
Forthcoming in Philosophy 
Daniel Groll and Micah Lott 
22 
precisely to make possible hunting and eating that is naturally good for ‘the tiger’. And if it did 
not do that – if running 150 miles an hour disrupted the performance of other vital activities – 
then being able to run that fast would not good for an individual tiger. So even here we don't 
have a case in which goodness for is present in the absence of goodness as. On the contrary, we 
are inclined to posit goodness for only because there is natural goodness in some respect. 
 Consider, finally, an even more fanciful example: doing philosophy seems like a good 
thing. Wouldn't it be good for a tiger if it could philosophize?31 Of course a tiger who cannot 
philosophize is not naturally bad, but a philosophizing tiger would surely be flourishing more 
than his non-philosophical fellow tigers. Moreover, it seems implausible to explain the goodness 
of this change in terms of its contribution to other characteristics of tiger flourishing. Rather, we 
are introducing something to tiger form that (purportedly) counts as an improvement all by itself. 
 Far from undermining the conceptual connection between natural goodness and 
flourishing, the prospect of a philosophical tiger actually reinforces that connection. For what are 
we being asked to imagine here? On the one hand, if we hold tiger-form more or less fixed, it is 
hard to imagine tigers philosophizing, since it would involve such a radical change in their 
capacities. To the extent that we are able to hold their form fixed, we reject as absurd the idea 
that philosophy would be good for them. Surely we don't think we will do them any benefit by 
starting up philosophy groups among them as they are now. On the other hand, if we imagine 
tigers with the capacities and the kind of life that enables them really to do philosophy, they 
would have to be so radically altered that we would no longer be dealing with the same form. So 
it would no longer make sense to say that philosophy is good for tigers since we would no longer 
be dealing with tigers (we would be dealing with phigers). Thus for any individual that we hold 
fixed as a tiger, we have to say that philosophy isn't good for it. And for any individual for which 
we imagine philosophy to be a good, we have to say it isn't a tiger.32 So this example actually 
reinforces, rather than undermines, the idea that there is a conceptual connection between natural 
goodness and goodness for. 
                                                
31We have adapted this example from Christine Korsgaard, ‘The Relational Character of the Good’ in Oxford 
Studies in Metaethics Vol. 8, Russ Shafer-Landau ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
32But can't we ask of this individual whether it would be better off as a tiger or a phiger? Our answer is the same: if 
the change is radical enough, then we'll deny that we're dealing with the same individual. If, on the other hand, we 
have a case where the very same individual persists through the change that is because its form has remained 
sufficiently stable. Of course, what counts as a radical enough change is a big question. A general and illuminating 
answer may not be available, and in any case our point does not require one.  
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7. Vulnerabilities and human form 
We have argued that a natural history provides both: a) the criterion for goodness as an 
organism of a given kind, and b) an account of what is good for those organisms. Given this, it is 
natural to describe the life-cycle – as described in the natural history – as the good of an 
organism. When an individual organism is/has/does everything in a non-defective way for its 
kind, then it achieves the good of such an organism – e.g. mayfly good, tiger good, human good.  
This picture appears to run into trouble, however, when we consider the place of 
vulnerabilities in a living thing’s life. It seems that at least some vulnerabilities are characteristic 
of certain kinds of organisms: A healthy deer hide is vulnerable to being pierced in ways that a 
healthy rhinoceros hide is not. A healthy human spine is vulnerable to shingles, and a healthy 
human soul is vulnerable to grief. So, the thought goes, certain characteristic vulnerabilities, 
connected to the particular kind of creature we are, seem like good candidates to be part of our 
form. They are neither individual defects nor merely part of a statistical conception of human 
nature.  
However, it seems strange to suppose that a vulnerability to defect or harm could be good 
for an organism, or part of the good of an organism. Indeed, the concept ‘vulnerability’ is tied to 
the idea of ‘harm’. To be vulnerable to something is to be susceptible to a kind of harm (we 
don’t say, except perhaps jokingly, that someone is vulnerable to health or happiness). And, 
other things being equal, it is not good for a creature to be susceptible to harm. Nor is it plausibly 
part of the good of an organism that it is susceptible to certain harms. So if vulnerabilities are 
part of our life form, then it appears that some aspects of human form are bad for us. And thus 
human form will be a mixed bag after all, and the Inert Viewform has all the support it needs. 
 But is it true that characteristic vulnerabilities are part of an organism’s form? Consider 
again the example of the deer’s vulnerable skin. On the one hand, we can certainly describe deer 
life form with statements like ‘the deer has skin that is vulnerable to being pierced in such-and-
such ways’. And an individual deer whose skin was vulnerable in that way would not be thereby 
defective, whereas an individual rhinoceros would be. On the other hand, however, if we imagine 
an individual deer whose skin was tougher and less vulnerable, and who did not experience any 
other problems as a result, we would not be inclined to say that this deer was defective. If 
anything, it would be especially good, a ‘super deer’. What explains this asymmetry?  
Recall that a given life form is understood, first and foremost, in terms of what the 
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organism is/has/does as part of its life-cycle. This means understanding various vital parts and 
processes in terms of the role they play in the life-cycle of the organism.33 But with 
vulnerabilities like the deer’s skin, the vulnerability as such – i.e., the skin’s susceptibility to 
particular harms – does not belong to the life-cycle of an organism in the same way as its parts 
and processes do. On the contrary, the vulnerability is merely a side-effect of other aspects of the 
life form. To see this, notice that there are good answers to the questions, ‘What does the deer’s 
skin do?’ and ‘What is the flexibility of the deer’s skin good for?’ But there are no comparable 
answers to the questions, ‘What is the pierce-ability of the deer’s skin good for? What does it 
allow the deer to do?’ Of course, we might come to understand how the skin’s particular 
vulnerability is a consequence of something that matters for the deer, namely that its skin is 
flexible enough to allow for very quick movements. But the pierce-ability itself is not for 
anything. Indeed, the deer would seem to be much improved if its skin were flexible and tough. 
And there is no reason, conceptually speaking, why it could not be. So even though a particular 
vulnerability is characteristic of deer skin, that vulnerability nonetheless belongs to deer form in 
a secondary and derivative way. It is not part of the good of the deer and, indeed, an individual 
deer might do a better job of realizing the good of the deer if it didn’t have such vulnerable skin. 
Likewise, while humans certainly have many characteristic side-effect vulnerabilities, these 
vulnerabilities do not show that human form itself is a mixed bag. 
 Things are more complicated, however, with a different type of vulnerability. Consider 
our vulnerability to heartbreak or devastating loss. Having a loving relationship with another 
person requires a kind of emotional openness and trust that necessarily makes one vulnerable to 
terrible disappointment and even extreme pain. We could not have loving relationships without 
these vulnerabilities, for the emotional openness and trust that makes for good loving 
relationships is precisely what makes us vulnerable to loss. Because such vulnerabilities appear 
to be in principle inseparable from a key feature of human form, let us call them inseparable 
vulnerabilities. 
Are inseparable vulnerabilities, then, part of what the human is/has/does in the primary 
sense? An answer, we believe, cannot be given apart from one’s substantive conception of the 
human. However, whatever one’s substantive conception, these vulnerabilities do not pose a 
problem for the framework we have articulated. To see why, suppose we ask, ‘What is the role of 
                                                
33 Cf. Foot Op cit. note 26, 30 – 33. 
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human vulnerability to heartbreak? What part does it play in human life?’ Perhaps one believes 
that no answer is forthcoming – that heartbreak is simply injury, and that the vulnerability to 
heartbreak is like the vulnerability to broken bones. To the extent that one views the vulnerability 
this way, one treats it as basically a side-effect vulnerability. The only difference is that, in the 
case of heartbreak, the vulnerability is an unavoidable consequence of something that is part of 
our good (our capacity for love). However, one might reject this view and insist that 
vulnerability to heartbreak does have a role in human life and that the vulnerability itself is good 
for something. It has certainly allowed for a tremendous amount of wonderful art. Some might 
argue that it allows for a certain depth of soul. In that case, it would be a mistake to think of 
vulnerability to heartbreak as a mere side-effect of human form. 
For our purposes, it does not matter which view is correct. The important point is that, 
whatever one’s substantive view, a connection holds between what one takes to belong to ‘the 
human’ in the primary sense, and what one takes to be good for individual humans. If one thinks 
of a vulnerability as having no proper part to play in human life, then one will not see the 
vulnerability as good for humans or part of the human good. And this is true even if you 
recognize that the vulnerability (e.g. possible heartbreak) is inherently unavoidable, given some 
other aspect of human good (e.g. loving relationships). Alternatively, if one thinks of the 
vulnerability as itself having a proper role in human life, then one must see the vulnerability 
itself as furthering or constituting some aspect of the life of ‘the human’ – and hence as in some 
way good for human beings. However, in neither case does what is good for human beings come 
apart from our characteristic life-cycle. Thus even inseparable vulnerabilities do not show that 
human form itself is a ‘mixed bag’ in a way that vindicates the Inert Viewform. 
8. Human form and human enhancement 
Let's take stock. We've shown that there is a conception of human nature – human form – 
that is not a mixed-bag: traits that are part of our form (in the primary sense) are part of the 
human good. Moreover, we've argued, our good qua humans is also what is good for us. If that's 
correct, then there is a conceptual connection between the kinds of creatures we are and welfare-
related practical reasons. In other words, human form is not normatively inert (even if human 
nature, statistically understood, is).  
By way of concluding, we want to say something about how the notion of human form 
we've developed relates to issues of human enhancement. Specifically, we offer the following 
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four conclusions. 
First, the notion of human form provides a conceptual framework in which we can best 
make sense of the objects of possible enhancement, namely a) widespread defects and b) 
characteristic vulnerabilities. As we argued above, the notion of human form allows us to 
explain what makes defects defects, namely that they interrupt the life-cycle of a particular 
individual as spelled out in a system of natural historical judgments about the kind of thing it is. 
A defect does not belong to the natural history; it does not play a part in the life of the species, 
and it is not part of the life form. This is true even if the defect is widespread and helps to explain 
much of what goes on with the species. Likewise, in describing something as a ‘vulnerability’, 
we are identifying it precisely as a liability to harm. And to understand what counts as harm and 
benefit we need to understand what furthers, and what disrupts, the parts and processes of an 
organism’s characteristic life-cycle.  
Second, the idea of human form is not at all in tension with enhancements that aim to 
eliminate either: a) widespread defects, or b) characteristic ‘side-effect’ vulnerabilities. In 
arguing for the existence of a normatively relevant conception of human nature, we've happily 
conceded that there is a normatively inert conception of human nature, namely the statistical 
conception. And we've granted that human nature understood statistically is very likely a mixed-
bag. So nothing we've said about human form supports arguments against enhancing ourselves 
in a way to rid ourselves of the bad parts of the mixed bag.34 Moreover, to the extent that a 
characteristic vulnerability is a mere side-effect, and not itself part of human good, then there is 
prima facie reason to think that we would be better off without it. (Of course, this comes with the 
big caveat that getting rid of the side effect vulnerability should not have other, substantial 
negative impacts elsewhere in our life-cycle.) At the same time, if we are dealing with what we 
termed an inseparable vulnerability, then we should recognize that removing that vulnerability 
would also threaten some part of the human good. This is not to say that, all things considered, 
we ought not to remove an inseparable vulnerability, but it does mean there is (some) prima facie 
reason against removing it. 
Third, proponents of the idea that there is such a thing as human form can make sense of, 
and agree with, the idea that it might be practically rational to alter human form itself. In short, 
                                                
34 Indeed, many such interventions might not be ‘enhancements’, strictly speaking, but therapeutic interventions to 
restore or preserve an aspect of proper functioning that commonly goes awry. 
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there is nothing inherently conservative in thinking that the notion of human form is highly 
relevant to enhancement debates. This conclusion applies not only to our characteristic 
vulnerabilities, but to our capacities in general. This point follows from our discussion of 
whether it would be good for tigers to be able to run faster. The upshot there was that a change to 
a particular part of a the tiger's form could be good for a tiger when making the change allows 
for greater realization of, or success in living up to, other parts of the tiger's form.35 And what 
goes for the tiger goes for the human. Improving our eyesight, for example, or even possibly 
giving ourselves the ability to fly, could be justified precisely in terms of how it allows us to do 
better with respect to other aspects of human form.36 Thus far from being irrelevant to debates 
about enhancement, or inherently conservative, the concept of human form allows us to 
understand better what it would mean to enhance ourselves and why we might have good 
reasons to do so. 
But our discussion of the tiger and the phiger also support our fourth conclusion: changes 
to a thing's form can only be evaluated in the context of the creature's form staying relatively 
fixed. If a proposed change is sufficiently radical – as is the case with the philosophical tigers – 
then we are not dealing with an alteration to a given form, but rather a new form altogether. And 
in those cases, it no longer makes sense to ask whether it would be good for the tiger (or a 
phiger37) to change in the way imagined. 
Notice that this is perfectly consistent with thinking that over time human form could 
change dramatically, just as Theseus' ship could change dramatically by changing one plank at a 
time over many years. Some of that change might come from incremental enhancements. What 
the human form view rules out is the intelligibility of performing radical enhancements on the 
grounds that doing so will be good for us.38 
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35 This is a necessary, not sufficient, condition.  
36 Again, any particular argument to this effect requires bringing a substantive conception of human form to the 
table. See above, p. 2. 
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